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a social Darwinist anxious to provide his particular form of Darwinism with a proper scientific basis, and to show that Darwin's ideas and socialism were complementary, and not opposed, as had been maintained by several leading thinkers of the nineteenth century. Biometry offered him the chance of pursuing these ends. Moreover, I shall argue, Pearson's conception of 'properly scientific' (as articulated in his philosophical writings) was one that made it probable that the development of biometry, should it be at all forthcoming, would yield a harvest of statistical methods. Statistics, thus formed, embodied the central tenets of Pearson's philosophy of science, and, as such, was to be universally recommended. It was to be applied to eugenics in particular, for eugenic thought was a component of Pearson's social Darwinism before his meeting with Weldon. Pearson's Darwinism and his philosophy of science, I shall argue, were integrated components in a world view constructed by Pearson in early manhood, when he was attempting to come to terms with the social and intellectual problems posed to him by his life within late-Victorian society. Thus, I shall argue, we must see Pearson's work in statistics as the outcome of his attempts to deal with his social and intellectual milieu.
The thesis is here developed in several sections, and it will perhaps be useful to give a preliminary account of the ordering of these sections and of their contents.
I commence with a section entitled 'Biometry and Statistics'. Here, after providing social and intellectual background to the biometric movement, I attempt to show something of the way in which biometric problems led to the creation of the statistical ideas for which Pearson is famous and which were to form the core of the tuition offered within his biometric laboratory and his department of applied statistics. At this stage, something of the relationship between the distinctive philosophy of science developed by Pearson before his meeting with Weldon and his subsequent biometric and statistical endeavours should start to become apparent. We should be able to see by the end of this section that the form taken by biometry, and its role as the midwife of statistics may largely be understood via its relations with the philosophical views formed by Pearson before he took to biometry. At this stage too, Pearson's espousal of statistics as a universal methodology should become comprehensible.
The second section, 'Science, Socialism and Social Darwinism', addresses the further topic of why it was that Pearson was prepared to be interested in biology when approached by Weldon. It is one thing, after all, to explain (in the manner of Section 1) the particular form taken by biometry, and to exhibit this form as a cause of biometry's having led to statistics. It is another, distinct task to explain why Pearson should have been prepared to enter into biological work. At the time it was not a recognized or honoured path for the mathematician and seems to have done little for Pearson's career prospects -as, for example, when he applied without success for the Savilian Chair at Oxford in 1897. The line I take in this second section is that of denying that Pearson was ever primarily interested in biology in its own right. I shall suggest rather that by the time of his meeting with Weldon, Pearson was already an established social Darwinian -that is to say, one who supposed that a scientific guide to human affairs could be obtained from the philosophy of Darwin, suitably interpreted. Pearson, I will show, entered into biometry, into evolutionary biology, not only with a view to giving an exemplar of a truly scientific biology, but also with the aim of providing his social Darwinism with suitable underpinnings; he also hoped to show that Darwinism enjoined a move to state socialism, rather than to the laissez-faire capitalism recommended by earlier writers on social Darwinism. At this stage too, we shall see that before meeting Weldon Pearson's thought already had a significant eugenic component. In a third section, entitled 'Scenes from a Victorian Life', I attempt to trace the development of the patterns of thought which, I claim, predisposed Pearson to take to biometry. Here I will discuss his early days in Cambridge, Heidelberg and London, tracing the incidents and problems thrust upon him by the conditions of his life; I will show how his responses to these led him to the 'primed' condition that disposed him to respond so favourably when approached by Weldon, and thus started the major enterprise of his life -the building up of a biometric school of statistics and social biology. Naturally, the explanations I offer have their difficulties, and, perhaps, foremost amongst these is that of explaining the particular pattern of Pearson's response to the stimuli of his early life. After all, in human affairs, the same set of stimuli do not always call forth the same response: here I explore the possibility of explaining Pearson's making the sort of response that he did in terms of the natural 'interests' of persons occupying his sort of social role in later Victorian society. Such a strategy has severe difficulties and these are finally made very clear.
BIOMETRY AND STATISTICS (a) General background
Biometry was a construct of England of the late 1890s, and to a degree to be determined, reflected its circumstances, some of which were as follows.
In 'scientific' England, in the home of Darwin, relatively little work had been done on the mechanism of evolution -on the physiology of heredity and variation and the action of natural selection, for example.9 Academic biologists, by and large, had tended to devote their energies to the establishment of the historical evolutionary relationships connecting different groups in the plant and animal kingdoms. Statistics, insofar as it was an institutionalized concern, was basically non-mathematical, despite the existence of good work by Venn, Marshall, Edgeworth and others. ' (b) Intellectual structures Let us now pass from the background to biometry to the subject itself. Statements of its aims were common in the literature, but it may conveniently be regarded as a discipline which applied mathematics to the study of the variations found among the members of large populations, including human populations. Perhaps the standard statement of biometric problems is one due to Weldon, published first in 1893:
The problem of animal evolution is essentially a statistical problem: that before we can properly estimate the changes at present going on in a race or species we must know accurately (a) the percentage of animals which exhibit a given amount of abnormality with regard to a particular character; (b) the degree of abnormality of other organs that accompanies a given abnormality of one; (c) the difference between the death rate per cent in animals of different degrees of abnormality with respect to any organ; (d) the abnormality of offspring in terms of the abnormality of parents and vice-versa. These are all questions of arithmetic; and when we know the numerical answers to these questions for a number of species, we shall know the direction and rate of change in these species at the present day -a knowledge which is the only legitimate basis for speculations as to their past history and future fate. 17 The statistical developments which the pursuit of these and related biometric problems led The purpose of the mathematical theory of statistics is to deal with the relationship between 2 or more variable quantities without assuming that one is a single-valued mathematical function of the rest. The statistician does not think a certain x will produce a single-valued y; not a causative relation but a correlation. The relationship between x and y will be somewhere within a zone and we have to work out the probability that the point (x,y) will lie in different parts of that zone. The physicist is limited and shrinks the zone into a line. Our treatment will fit all the vagueness of biology, sociology, etc. A very wide science.20
Galton had developed the notions of correlation and regression whilst studying heredity in man, but in doing so, he always linked his statistical investigations with exercises in theorizing about the physiology of heredityabout the underlying biological mechanisms that might be responsible for the patterns of correlation and regression which he observed. 21 Pearson had absolutely no time for such a combined approach. Science, for him, was the stern business of observation and measurement, and he stressed heavily what is now termed 'operational definition'. The thrust of his approach may be gauged from the following Pearsonian definition of the problem of heredity.
Heredity. Given any organ in a parent and the same or any other organ in its offspring, the mathematical measure of heredity is the correlation of these organs for pairs of parent and offspring . . . The word organ here must be taken to include any characteristic which can be quantitatively measured. 22 Pearson's goal was a phenomenal theory of heredity lacking any theoretical mediation (such as Galton's ideas on hereditary particles). Given his chosen mathematical measure of heredity, it is unsurprising that biometry should have led to the developments in theory mentioned above. Let us take a particular example namely, Pearson's development of the theory of multivariate normal correlation. This was first presented in a memoir of 1896 in which he investigated contemporary claims that a relaxation of natural selection would put evolution into reverse.23 This, of course, was a view that could be supported by citing Galton's observation that sons regressed linearly upon fathers in respect of stature with a coefficient of regression of about one third. This suggested that if an 'improved' population deviating from an original population mean stature by z inches was allowed to reproduce without the operation of selection, then successive generations of posterity would show z/3, z/9, z/27 inches of deviation, and so on. Pearson was anxious to combat this view, and while I prefer to discuss his motivation for so doing at a later point in the paper, it is worth pointing out that even at this early stage the social and eugenic side of biometry was present in Pearson's published works.24 For, while he treats this problem of regression quite generally, he does make it clear that the human situation is of most concern.
Galton, of course, was familiar with the bivariate normal distribution -for that, in good approximation, is the distribution followed by parental and filial statures taken jointly.25 Pearson now, in an attempt to construct a model allowing for the influence of ancestry more distant than the immediate parentage, developed an expression for the joint distribution of n normal variates -an expression, that is, for the multivariate normal correlation surface. He hoped that it would transpire that the values of the various correlation coefficients connecting different degrees of ancestry would be such as to yield multiple regression equations which indicate that when a line of ancestry had been long selected (that is, if the grandfather and the great grandfather and so on had been exceptional as well as the immediate parentage), then regression of the sort observed by Galton among the general population would no longer occur. This, indeed, was the start of Pearson's work on the 'law of ancestral heredity', which deserves separate treatment.26 All that matters for the moment is that the very significant step of developing the theory of multivariate normal correlation arose from a concern with a biological problem and from a determination to treat the problem in a particular way. Interestingly, in the same paper Pearson showed that the best value of correlation coefficient (P ) of a bivariate normal distribution is given by the formula now said to give the 'sample product moment coefficient of correlation. ' We can see therefore that Pearson's massive developments of the statistical theory of correlation, the branch of his work that he invested with the highest significance, orginated in his theory-free approach to heredity. He wished to make probabilistic predictions about the outcome of a line of ancestry without the necessity of discussing underlying mechanisms of heredity. This was quite out of step with contemporary biological practice, which was, if anything, a great deal more interested in getting to grips with the underlying physiology of heredity than in the sheer business of prediction. But, said Pearson, on the eve of the rediscovery of Mendel's ideas, the would-be physiologists were like planetary theorists rushing to prescribe a law of attraction for planets, the very orbital forms of which they have not first ascertained. 27 It was in this way that the advantage of biometry led to developments in statistical theory -a circumstance, of course, that it is quite consistent with the mathematics, once embarked upon, 'taking up a life of its own': issues like those of the sampling distribution of the correlation coefficient then 'arose naturally' and had to be dealt with. But the point remains that the search for a new mathematical science of heredity, for a science of a particularly austere sort, led to developments in statistical theory.
Correlation looms large in Pearson's work, and this should not surprise us, having seen his definition of the purposes of statistics. But, as Stouffer showed, Pearson's work was not exhausted by his labours in the field of correlation. Other aspects of his work also arose in a biometric context, and it is not too much to say that they reflect an approach to science with a massive emphasis on the production of mathematical ways of describing observable phenomena, and on ways of checking up on the goodness of the description. Thus, for example, Pearson's first biometric paper was devoted to developing a method for deciding whether a particular assymetrical frequency curve found by Weldon when sampling crabs could be resolved as the sum of two normal distributions.28 His second paper developed the series of Pearson curves as a way of describing non-symmetrical and unresolvable distributions of (biological) data.29 And, generally, if the correlational part of Pearson's work stemmed from a desire to find theory-free connections between different sets of data, then the aim in this other part of his work seems to have been to find ways of accurately describing any given set of data -notably by fitting a curve to it. Not all of Pearson's early statistical developments can be seen as the direct outcome of attempts to deal with specific biological problems, but they can, I think, be reasonably seen as more general developments jibing with the aims for biometry (and, more generally, for science) noted already in Pearson's approach. The chi-squared goodness of fit test, for example, developed in 1900, is surely a good instance. 30 It is not that if we know Pearson's aims for science, his insistence on mathematical representation of the phenomena as the major goal, then we are led to the test. That is where his genius came into play. Rather, it is that if we understand these aims and goals we can see the attraction, for him, in pursuing such a mathematical investigation.
(c) Questions of method The remarks just made about the methodological style of biometry may be supported by going to texts, to Pearson's methodological writings which were largely completed before his entry into biometry. They were most widely publicized in his Grammar of Science, first published in 1892.3' Given the aims and goals of biometry at the level of methodology we can, I hope, see why and how biometry led on to statistics. What I wish to suggest now is that it is no surprise that biometry had these aims and goals, for they came directly out of Pearson's already formed methodological ideas. These, interestingly, were ones that he could develop and enhance as he developed his statistical thought.
In the three editions of the Grammar (1892, 1900, 1911) we find a philosophy of science which resembles some of the views of the later Logical Positivist school of philosophy. In a doctoral thesis Chauncey Riddle has discerned three main components to Pearson's epistemological writings, namely 'empiricism, a Kantian emphasis on the role of the mind in organising and interpreting sensation, and a Cartesian faith in mathematics as the key to organised scientific thought'.32 The Grammar, Riddle notes, is 'largely an attempt to impress the ideas of Mach upon the English speaking world'. This seems entirely correct; Pearson was an instrumentalist and a sensationalist, a man who denied the possibility of getting to grips with the Ding an sich and who expressly ruled out the possibility of a fruitful metaphysics. Metaphysical speculation, he in effect said, was meaningless. Objects, in this philosophy, were mental constructs out of sense data, and what so fascinates one about this aspect of Pearson's thought is his Kantian emphasis on the possibly active power of the mind in creating experience. For he wrote that it may be the perceptive faculty itself, which, without being directly conscious of it, contributes the ordered sequence in time and space to our sense impressions. The routine of perceptions may be due to the recipient and not characteristic of the material. 33 Any connection, through experience, between the self and the real world was therefore highly tenuous, and the only goal for science that made sense was an instrumental one. One could not learn about underlying realities, and the postulation of a realist ontology of atoms, molecules and so on was, in this philosophy, rendered incoherent or redundant. All that science could do was to uncover laws that summarized the flow of phenomena and functioned as instruments of prediction, whose ultimate rationale lay in the enhanced potential for survival that they offered in the evolutionary struggle. This they did best when they partook of the economy and precision granted by expression in mathematical form. Pearson, clearly, saw biometry as an exemplar of his philosophy put into operation. He saw himself as finally ridding biology of its traditional metaphysical integuements, and took pains to introduce two new chapters on biometry in the second edition of the Grammar.
Biometry, clearly, was a natural Pearsonian research programme and, it should also be clear, the statistical methods emanating from it must be seen as the mathematical encapsulation of a philosophy of science Pearson had developed before taking up biometry. Good Cartesian that he was, statistics offered a mathematical way of economically describing the flow of appearances in the nonphysical sciences. But, good Kantian that he was in other respects, statistics offered the makings of a philosophical revolution which could be carried forward as his work in biometry and statistics grew. As his contributions to the theory of correlation became more refined, Pearson took to suggesting that this work was philosophically profound. For it showed that the great Kant had been wrong in asserting that determinism was a precondition for human experience.34 What was needed, Pearson wrote, was the kind of semi-determinism that the statistical methods of correlation were adapted to handling. The category under which experience fell was not deterministic causation, but, rather, the looser framework now describable via the mathematical theory of correlation. All scientists, he thundered, should desist from trying to conceptualize the world under the category of causation. Instead, they should adopt the new category implicit in his own work, namely that of correlation, under which all our experience whatever of the links between phenomena can be classified.35
All of the foregoing, I hope, lends support to the thesis that biometry begat statistics on account of its peculiar methodological form. This, by turn, was due to the circumstance that before meeting Weldon, Pearson had worked out a distinctive epistemology and methodology for science. In particular, the Kantian tinge of this philosophy made it possible for Pearson to see his work in correlation as being philosophically significant -a feature which undoubtedly sustained his interest in correlation and all its possible ramifications.
SCIENCE, SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL DARWINISM
I now come to the problem of why it was that fifteen years after graduation, after a period in which he had done no biological work at all, Pearson should have been prepared to embark upon a new career in biometry when tackled by Weldon in the early 90s. One response, seemingly that of J.B.S. Haldane, is that Pearson's decision to move in a biological direction rather than some other, and his founding Biometrika rather than, say, Technometrika, were largely accidents of fate: it just happened to be Weldon, a biologist, who wished for assistance.36 It seems to me that such an approach is implausible, for it undervalues the magnitude of (iv) On scientific grounds, therefore, the proper goal for the members of a society is the production of 'a finely regulated social system' enabling it best to survive in the struggle and to emerge 'among the surviving fit'. The best way to achieve this was a move to a form of state socialism, run by talented experts.
By now, I suggest, we should be able to see why work in evolutionary biology could so attract Pearson; why he was, so to speak, 'primed' to respond to Weldon. We can see too, at least in outline (an outline to be filled in in the next section), why eugenics could so attract him -for eugenics was just the branch of evolutionary biology that could be deployed to maximize the fitness of the socialist state envisaged by Pearson Here, it seems plain, we have the source of Pearson's preparedness to enter the field of evolutionary biology.
SCENES FROM A VICTORIAN LIFE
If the foregoing analysis is approximately correct, and it is accepted that Pearson's readiness to enter into biometry and the power of biometry to produce statistics linked to eugenics can be understood in terms of the social, ethical and epistemological ideas which Pearson had developed prior to his meeting with Weldon, then there remains the task of explaining how it is that he came to have this intellectual disposition. It is to this task that I now turn, and I shall proceed by discussing Pearson's development during his 'prebiometric' phase -that is, the period in which he was an undergraduate, a fellow of King's and a London-based intellectual. As the section develops it should be possible to clarify the exact nature of Pearson's 'non-scientific' thought. (b) Heidelberg In Heidelberg, doubtlessly, Pearson hoped to find a new philosophy, a new creed that would satisfy his need for something in which to believe. We can garner something of his mood and thoughts from his letters, but also from a book, the New Werther, which Pearson published under the pen-name 'Loki'. The Werther, Pearson was to claim, was written in a deliberately 'gush style', but nevertheless it tells a great deal about Pearson's time in Germany -for, judging from Pearson's other attempts at fiction, it seems improbable that he had the skill to create a character whose thoughts strayed too far from his own. In the pages of the Werther we learn a great deal about his unhappiness in Cambridge, his decision to turn to Germany -the 'country of ideas' -and his love of things German, which was to be reflected in his changing his name from Carl to Karl. In Germany he seems to have developed a mild nature-mysticism and to have kept the company of Raphael Wertheimer, a Jewish law student and radical who features prominently in the Werther; there he is depicted as introducing Arthur (the autobiographical tragic hero) to socialism, saying of the English that they do not recognise the difference between a French communist, a Russian nihilist, and a German social democrat, but brand them with a common stigma as subverters of society.55
Wertheimer, a social democrat, insisted that
We do not wish a revoutionary change in all old laws and customs; we recognise the truths which history has taught, that real change is gradual, and yet also that change is necessary to life. The violence of some persons claiming to be members of the party is due to the ignorant and vicious whom the leaders cannot prevent from joining their banner.56
Clearly, Wertheimer found a convert of sorts in Pearson, who thereafter proclaimed himself a socialist -though, as will become ever more apparent, an elitist state-socialist. This comes out rather clearly in one of the first papers which he wrote after his return from Germany, a short work entitled 'Anarchy'. In this he wrote with genuine horror of the state of London's sub-proletariat:
Those weak and emaciated beings, weak and feeble as they look, have the power in their millions to throw down the few feet of bricks which guard the arsenals. Those three million could sweep a few thousand police and soldiers before them as the wind blows a handful of chaff. 57 He was fearsome lest there be an uncontrolled anarchic revolution from below, something he took to be the natural outcome of existing conditions. In its place, Pearson recommended a gradual 'revolution' from above, leading to a form of society with 'forms and grades' and with power based not on a financial hierarchy but on a hierarchy of 'power intellectual' which alone would determine whether the life-calling of a man is to scavenge the streets, or to guide a nation.58
How the transfer was to be effected was unstated, but, Pearson insisted, the new order would need a new religion which would form a real bond 'between class and class, between man and man solely on the score of their manhood'.
Some indication of what this might mean was given in a further paper of the same year, on 'Political Economy for the Proletariat', which attacked traditional political economy and compared the 'individualism of Bentham' unfavourably with the 'socialism of Fichte'. Pearson, clearly, was attached to some of Fichte's ideas, and wrote that in the new order, for which he (Pearson) hoped, the state would be charged with the duty of 'the improvement of man-kind', and that in the science that would treat of the organization of the state.
All the ordinary categories of political economy -capital, labour, land, trade and so forth -must be judged from this new standpoint, and I fear not a few of the results attained will be found to differ from the mammon-worshipping doctrines of Ricardo and his disciples. 59 The nearest extant approach to what he had in mind, wrote Pearson, again reflecting his German experience, was to be found in the work of the Katheder-Socialisten who, under Schmoller, helped frame Bismarck's social policies. In particular, Pearson singled out the ideas of Held and his school, citing their claims and demands with approval:
They demand that the economic man must also be considered as a member of a state organism, they reject the suggestion of an unusually valid natural law, and demand that each existing judicial system must in whole and part be considered critically as a factor of the greatest importance in the formation of economic relations . In these writings two trends may be discerned. In the Commonsense, Pearson developed the epistemological ideas which had begun to crystallize whilst in Germany, ideas bringing him closer to the Grammar of Science. While preparing the Commonsense Pearson read the works of Ernst Mach, and when contributing his own ideas on the laws of motion was delighted to be able to record that these views seemed to have 'the weighty authority of Professor Mach of Prag'. By 1885, it would seem, the creation of his philosophy of science was almost complete. 65 Pearson's social, political and ethical thought underwent a more significant development, for we find an increasing introduction of 'Darwinian' ideas when discussing social organization and moral principles. This, perhaps, is unsurprising, for Darwin's ideas were then on everyone's tongues. It is hard to say precisely where Here, it seems, is laid bare the basis of Pearson's preparedness to enter biological work. By 1890 several ideas were converging. Pearson had adopted a Darwinian historicism to justify his state socialism, and, as we can see, his interest in national fitness was moving on from issues of organization to issues of biological efficiency: already he was concerned with eugenic problems, as well as the more general issues of evolution. In the period up to 1890, therefore, we can see the emergence of a framework of thought that would make biometry an attractive proposition, which would make it a science likely to produce statistical results which could be prized for their philosophical significance, and which could be used in eugenic investigations. This should be seen as another phase of Pearson's socialism, with its emphasis on national fitness and the production of a socialist elite class of administrators of the highest quality. In short, we can see that many of Pearson's ideas appear to be enhancing the esteem of the group with whom he identified. Whether or not such a harmonization can be seen as explaining his espousal of these ideas is, it seems to me, a question that brings us hard against the philosophical difficulties inherent in explaining an individual's thought in terms of the interests of a group to which he has attached himself. Perhaps it is unwise to take this issue on at this point. It needs separate treatment. Possibly the case of Pearson and statistics could serve as a useful reference in such discussions.
CONCLUSION
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